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Domestic Relations-Recent
Kentucky Developments, 1950-1955
By FREDERICK W. WHITESIDE, JR.*
The volume of litigation in domestic relations cases, as shown
by the reported decisions on appeal, has continued to be heavy
during the past five years. Since few of the decisions are sig-
nificant from the standpoint of establishing new legal principles,
this article will be limited to comment on those decisions which
involve interesting application of familiar principles and notation
of the more significant problems which have been discussed in
notes in the Kentucky Law Journal over the past five years.
MARRIAGE
Validity-Although the Kentucky statute purports to make
"void" as many as seven different types of purported marriages,
not all of these are completely inoperative for all purposes in the
absence of a decree of annulment during the lifetime of the parties.
Among the purported marriages which are "void" upon collateral
attack without any annulment proceedings are miscegenous mar-
riages, marriages between persons of closer relationship than
second cousins, common law marriages, purported marriages when
there is a prior subsisting marriage, marriages procured by fraud
or duress or while one of the parties is under mental disability.'
In a recent case a purported marriage between first cousins, cele-
brated only a few months after the statute voiding such marriages
had been passed in 1946, was held completely void on collateral
attack in a proceeding by the first cousin as the widow claiming
her share in the estate of the deceased service man to whom she
thought she was married and with whom she lived as his wife.2
The Kentucky policy which has outlawed "common law" mar-
riages since 1852 does not prevent the Kentucky courts from
* A.B., University of Arkansas; LL.B., Cornel University. Member of Arkan-
sas, Kentucky and New York Bars. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.'Ky. RFv. STAT. secs. 402.010, 402.020.
" Bowen v. Bowen, 247 S.W. 2d 379 (Ky., 1952).
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recognizing as valid, under general principles of conflict of laws,
a marriage without any ceremony entered into by the parties while
resident in a state recognizing common law marriages, but the
Kentucky courts insist that the residence of the parties in the other
state as well as their intention to become man and wife must be
clearly proved in order to be recognized in Kentucky and will not
presume this where the relationship began by the parties living
in Kentucky and was therefore meretricious in its inception.
3
The applicable statute on capacity to enter into a valid mar-
riage provides that a marriage "with an idiot or a lunatic" is
"prohibited and void".4 It is the condition of the parties' minds
at the time of the marriage that is controlling, however, and it is
quite possible sometimes to find sufficient capacity despite a
previous adjudication of incompetence or even insanity, provided
that the contracting spouse has the ability to understand the
nature of the marriage relationship at the time of the celebration.5
In Littreal v. Littreal6 the evidence of capacity was held to over-
come the previous adjudication of incompetency of the husband
and appointment of a committee for his affairs. Following this
case a recent note in the Kentucky Law Journal discussed the types
of adjudication bearing upon capacity to marry in Kentucky.
7
Although the capacity of a party to marry is governed by the law
of the state where the marriage takes place and a marriage valid
where contracted will be recognized in Kentucky, it is possible
that a marriage in a sister state by a person previously adjudicated
insane by the Kentucky court may not be recognized in Kentucky
on the ground of violation of a fundamental public policy of Ken-
tucky."
The statute prohibiting officials authorized to solemnize the
marriage ceremony from soliciting marriages will be enforced.9
Presumptions-There is a presumption that a valid marriage
exists from the fact that a man and woman live together and
"Kennedy v. Damron, 268 S.W. 2d 22 (Ky., 1954), commented upon in an
article, Lacy, Family Law, 80 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 30 (1955); Carroll v. Carroll, 251
S.W. 2d 989 (Ky., 1952).
'Ky. tREv. STAT. sec. 402.020.5 Cook v. Cook, 243 S.W. 2d 900 (Ky., 1951).
'253 S.W. 2d 247 (Ky., 1952).
Youngblood, Domestic Relations-Capacity to Marry, 43 Ky. L.J. 415 (1955).
'Beddow v. Beddow, 257 S.W. 2d 45 (Ky., 1952).
'Ladd v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W. 2d 517 (Ky., 1950).
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establish a reputation that they are husband and wife. This pre-
sumption, however, may not be applied in the face of contrary
evidence. Thus, in one case the court refused to indulge in the
presumption where there was some evidence of a mere illicit
relationship and the woman claiming to be decedent's widow
had taken an inconsistent position, first asserting but failing to
prove a ceremonial marriage in Ohio, and later in the same pro-
ceedings offering evidence of a common law marriage in Florida.
Although the parties had lived together with an appearance of
matrimonial ties in both Kentucky and Florida, the court was
unable to find from the evidence a valid common law marriage in
Florida.'0 A question of conflicting presumptions as to continuing
validity of two marriages was resolved in Trimble v. Wells," when
it was shown that a divorce action involving the first marriage had
not been carried to completion, thus causing to disappear any
presumption of validity of the second marriage.
DIVORCE
Jurisdiction-Some interesting developments have taken place
in regard to the jurisdictional prerequisites for a divorce action
in Kentucky. Weintraub v. Murphy2 was an exercise by the Court
of Appeals of an original writ of prohibition to the Circuit Court
to compel determination of the husband's required one year
residence within the state. The non-resident defendant chal-
lenging plaintiff's residence was held entitled to a special appear-
ance for the sole purpose of challenging the jurisdictional fact of
residence without being compelled to litigate all of the issues. The
statute3 denying an appeal from a judgment granting a divorce
was cited by the court. It construed this statute to preclude an
appeal from a merely erroneous judgment by the lower court as
to the existence of jurisdiction, adopting as its premise that such
a judgment would not necessarily be void but may be merely
erroneous. And since appeal would therefore be unavailable
should the decree grant the divorce, the writ of prohibition was
the only remedy whereby the non-resident defendant could re-
10 Carroll v. Carroll, 251 S.W. 2d (Ky., 1952).
284 S.W. 2d 683 (Ky., 1950).12240 S.W. 2d 594 (Ky., 1951).
'Ky. PE-v. STAT. sec. 21.060.
REcNT Doxmsnc RELATIONS CAsES
quire the determination of the jurisdictional fact of plaintiff's
residence. In answer to the presumption that every public officer
will perform his duty the Court of Appeals stated. . . "we will not
presume that public officers (including courts and their officers)
will not sometimes act erroneously while performing that duty".
Though the writ of prohibition enabled the non-resident de-
fendant ii the divorce action to obtain in effect a limited appeal
on the jurisdictional fact of residence, this the court considered
the very thing she was entitled to by her special appearance.
On another original writ of prohibition based upon lack of
residence by the plaintiff, the appellate court affirmed the finding
that a serviceman originally from Kentucky had maintained his
Kentucky residence (in the sense of domicile) despite his pre-
vious application for the Ohio Veteran's Bonus and letters to his
wife in Brooklyn that he considered his permanent residence to
be the home of his wife's parents.' 4
Jurisdiction of the Kentucky court, based upon residence of
only one of the parties who has the non-resident party served by
publication, was sustained in Kenmont Coal Co. v. Fisher.5 The
procedure upon which the case reached the court was unusual.
The non-resident wife, claiming to have had no notice of the
divorce proceedings in 1947, filed a petition in equity after the
death of plaintiff-husband against his administrator to vacate the
divorce decree for want of one year's residence and won an award
annulling the divorce because of "jurisdictional fraud" on the
court in that the matrimonial domicile was in Maryland. There-
upon the present plaintiff, a former employer of the deceased hus-
band who had not been made a party to the action to annul,
brought the instant action to set aside the judgment vacating the
divorce, basing its interest in the subject matter of the litigation
upon its financial responsibility which it first discovered when the
non-resident wife filed her claim under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law as widow of deceased. The deceased husband's employer
was held to have standing to set aside the decree vacating the
divorce, to which action it was a necessary party, since its property
rights were involved. The rule limiting such actions to the
divorced parties themselves applies to suits affecting the divorce
Russell v. Hill, 256 S.W. 2d 508 (Ky., 1953).
'259 S.W. 2d 480 (Ky., 1953).
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directly but not when property rights of third parties are affected.
On the merits, the court went on to hold that the decree vacating
the divorce should be set aside, thus reinstating the divorce. The
divorce decree should not have been set aside "without clear and
convincing proof of an utter lack of jurisdiction".16 The evidence
of lack of residence in the action to vacate was insufficient to over-
come the finding of the fact of residence by the Circuit Court
when it first granted the divorce. The court, therefore, had
jurisdiction to grant the divorce and the judgment vacating it
was a nullity. The power of the Court of Appeals to vacate the
decree vacating the divorce was thus held to rest upon the lack
of power of the lower court to vacate its own divorce decree when
based upon proper jurisdiction.
Recognition of out-of-state divorces-While a divorce decree
in any state having jurisdiction is entitled to full faith and credit
in every state, the home state of the parties to the marriage has
generally reserved the right to deny effect to a divorce decree
rendered by a sister state without jurisdiction. Thus the Kentucky
court will not give effect to a Nevada decree when that court
lacks jurisdiction because of the failure of the party who goes
there to get the divorce to acquire more than a temporary presence
in that state. And on proper petition the Kentucky court will
re-litigate the issue of bona fide residence in Nevada even though
the Nevada court has already specifically determined such resi-
dence as a fact in connection with its decree. 17 This is in line
with recent United States Supreme Court pronouncements per-
mitting the re-determination of the existence of jurisdictional
prerequisites for divorce under the full faith and credit clause.'
Venue-The statute governing venue between counties re-
quires that the action for divorce be brought in the county where
the wife usually resides. 19 Cases challenging the propriety of
venue have recently arisen, both on appeal 20 and on original writ
"' Id. at 482. Of course annulling a divorce decree based upon proper juris-
diction is another matter and may be done upon joint application of the parties.
242 S.W. 2d 747 (Ky., 1951).
" Coe v. Coe, 884 U.S. 878, 68 S. Ct. 1094 (1948); Williams v. North
Carolina, 817 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207 (1942), 825 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092 (1945).
It is everywhere the law, however, that the domicile of just one of the parties
gives a state jurisdiction for divorce. See Pollitt, Quick Divorce, 89 Ky. L.J. 289
(1951).
"Ky. REv. STAT. see. 452.470.
o Carter v. Carter, 273 S.W. 2d 823 (Ky. 1954).
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of prohibition.21 No period of time of the wife's residence is re-
quired to confer venue, but her actual residence within the county
at the time suit is brought is the test.
22
Dismissal-The public policy involved in the dismissal of
divorced proceedings was touched upon in Huls v. Smith,23 a case
arising on original petition for mandamus to compel the lower
court to dismiss. Conceding the usual liberality in allowing a
divorce action to be dismissed on petition of both parties where
reconciliation may be achieved, the chancellor's exercise of dis-
cretion in refusing dismissal was upheld in view of the particular
circumstances of the case. These circumstances included unlikeli-
hood of any reconciliation or settlement and the fact that the
dismissal did not take care of the children, orders for whose sup-
port the defendant-husband had disregarded. Further, the dis-
missal had been consented to by the wife without the advice of
her attorney and ignored an award to her attorney of a fee pay-
able by the defendant.
The dependence of the client upon his attorney, in this as in
other types of adversary proceedings, was brought to light in a
case where the wife had instructed her attorney to dismiss and
thought he had done so. Meanwhile, the action not having been
dismissed, her husband procured a divorce on his counterclaim and
it could not be set aside.
2 4
Grounds-The statutory provision in Kentucky recognizes as a
ground for divorce by either husband or wife physical and mental
cruelty under certain circumstances. The physical cruelty is cast
in terms of "... such cruel beating or injury, or attempt at injury
.. as indicates an outrageous temper... or probable danger...
to life, or of great bodily injury .... " The form of mental cruelty
provided is "Habitually behaving.... for not less than six months,
in such cruel and inhuman manner as to indicate a settled aver-
sion . . . or to destroy permanently . . . peace or happiness."2 5
However, to be a sufficient ground in favor of the wife, unlike
the husband, there is the additional proviso, "if she is not in like
1 Stewart v. Yager, 272 S.W. 2d 674 (Ky., 1954) (Suit held properly brought
in county of wife's old residence where move to new residence not completed).
"- Brumfield v. Baxter, 307 Ky. 316, 210 S.W. 2d 972 (1949); Carter v.
Carter, supra note 21.
2 52 S.W. 2d 917 (Ky., 1952).
' McKay v. McKay, 260 S.W. 2d 945 (Ky., 1953).
Ky. Rnv. STAT. sec. 403.020.
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fault". Like language affecting the right of the husband had been
omitted in an amendment to the earlier statute, and the court
noticed the omission in at least one case.26 It was recently held,
however, that the omission would not have the effect of giving a
husband "in like fault" a right to divorce on the ground of
cruelty because the doctrine of recrimination would operate to
bar him.
27
The greatest volume of reported divorce cases deal with some
form of cruelty. There are numerous recent cases reversing the
lower court's denial of a divorce28 and others affirming that the
divorce was properly granted incidental to appellate review of the
appropriateness of the alimony or property settlement awarded.29
There have also been cases affirming the denial of a divorce be-
cause of insufficient evidence or because of recriminatory conduct
by the plaintiff.30
In providing for adultery as a ground for divorce, the Ken-
tucky statute is seemingly more liberal in granting a divorce to the
husband than to the wife, in that the husband can be granted a
divorce for the wife's adultery or such lewd and lascivious conduct
as to prove her unchaste whereas a divorce against the husband
can be had only for "living in adultery". 31 There have been
cases dealing with what type of conduct is sufficient to create the
inference of unchastity. Two days in Evansville, Indiana, with
another man was held sufficient.32 Occasionally the evidence falls
Muth v. Muth, 314 Ky. 531, 236 S.W. 2d 469 (1951).
' Fenner v. Fenner, 273 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky., 1954).
"York v. York, 280 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky., 1955); Coleman v. Coleman, 269 S.W.
2d 730 (Ky., 1954), noted 48 Ky. L.J. 322 (1955); Carlton v. Carlton, 265 S.W.
2d 477 (Ky., 1954) (husband abusive, threatening, once vicious); Eckhoff v.
Eckhoff, 247 S.W. 2d 374 (Ky., 1951) (Wife entitled to absolute divorce, mental
cruelty); Jones v. Jones, 246 S.W. 2d 583 (Ky., 1952) (error to refuse divorce
solely because testimony of plaintiff was uncorroborated); Moore v. Moore, 238
S.W. 2d 999 (Ky., 1951) (Instructions to wife to return to her parents and decide
whether she wanted to live with him held refusal to permit her to return and
justified divorce to wife on ground of cruelty.)
"Shick v. Shick, 260 S.W. 2d 944 (Ky., 1953) (physical cruelty); Puckett
v. Puckett, 258 S.W. 2d 519 (Ky., 1953); Lampkin v. Lampkin, 258 S.W. 2d
720 (Ky., 1952) (mental cruelty, settled aversion); Childers v. Childers, 243 S.W.
2d 929 (Ky., 1951 (wife's leaving home was cruelty); Crawford v. Crawford, 233
S.W. 2d 505 (Ky., 1950) (physical cruelty); Patterson v. Patterson, 266 S.W. 2d
91 (Ky., 1954) (Baseless counterclaim charging adultery was itself cruelty).
" Cadden v. Cadden, 272 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky., 1954) (without prejudice to seek
a divorce after five year period of separation on that ground); Fenner v. Fenner,
273 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky., 1953) (applied recrimination); Dean v. Dean, 238 S.W.
2d 672 (Ky., 1951) (mere "shortcomings", no divorce).
Ky. RBv. STAT., sec. 403.020.
Brumley v. Brumley, 247 S.W. 2d 987 (Ky., 1952).
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short of justifying a divorce for adultery, but the association of
one of the spouses with a person of the opposite sex may be so
serious in character or so notorious as to constitute a ground for
divorce on the ground of cruelty.33 Also cruel enough for a divorce
may be unfounded charges of adultery.34
There are two statutory provisions in Kentucky providing for
absolute divorce because of abandonment and separation. One
provision, which is strictly speaking referred to as the desertion
statute, gives a right of divorce to the party not in fault for
abandonment for one year. The other provision, the "living
apart" statute, gives a right of divorce to either party without
regard to fault when the spouses have lived apart "without any
cohabitation for five consecutive years next preceding the applica-
tion."35 The latter statute, though not in the category of a
desertion statute, nevertheless requires the intention by at least
one of the parties to continue to live apart from his spouse coupled
with the uninterrupted separation. This five year provision has
had some court construction. In one fairly recent case the Court
of Appeals, in reversing the alimony award, considered that the
husband should not have been granted an absolute divorce where
the husband and wife had lived together in the same house, even
though they did not eat or sleep together and there was no soci-
ability whatever.36 This decision was contrasted with the position
of a recent District of Columbia case and other authorities dis-
cussed in a note in the Journal.37
Abandonment to satisfy the one year statute was held estab-
lished where the wife admitted having ordered the husband out
of the family home, saying on the stand "I should have kicked
him out".38 One court held that a divorce on the ground of either
abandonment or cruelty, unlike adultery, may be granted on the
uncolroborated evidence of one of the parties if persuasive
enough. 30 Although the court cannot reverse that portion of the
Crawford v. Crawford, 233 S.W. 2d 505 (Ky., 1952) (Wife publicly kissing
another man).
Rupard v. Rupard, 301 Ky. 554, 192 S.W. 2d 477 (1945).
Ky. REV. STAT. see. 403.020.
Ratliff v. Ratliff, 312 Ky. 450, 227 S.W. 2d 989 (1950); cf. Evans v. Evans,
247 Ky. 1, 56 S.W. 2d 547 (1933).
1 Hoge, Divorce: "Living Apart" Under the Same Roof?, 41 Ky. L.J. 110
(1952).
'Hannan v. Hannan, 256 S.W. 2d 485 (Ky., 1953).
'Jones v. Jones, 246 S.W. 2d 583 (Ky., 1952).
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judgment which grants a divorce, it can hold, incident to review
of the alimony award, that a divorce should have been granted to
the wife on the ground of abandonment instead of to the husband
for cruelty.
40
Defenses-The common law defense of recrimination continues
to be applied in Kentucky. Several recent cases have denied a
divorce to a plaintiff himself guilty of serious misconduct.41 It is
true that one case 42 affirmed an anomalous type of lower court
decree awarding a divorce to both parties because of cruelty by
both of them without mentioning the possibility of recrimination
as a bar. This holding can be partially explained by the fact that
the Court of Appeals cannot reverse that portion of a judgment
granting a divorce although it can reconsider the correctness of
the judgment in reviewing the determination as to alimony. A
note on this case discusses other possible bases upon which the
holding might well have been predicated, and concludes that the
case has not lessened the hold of recrimination in Kentucky in the
light of other decisions.4 3 A criticism of the doctrine and dis-
cussion of the means whereby other states have allowed a trend
toward its rejection appears in an earlier note.4 4 Very recently a
case in California attracted national attention by practically abol-
ishing by judicial interpretation the defense in that state.
45
Another recent case now being noted in the Journal clarifies
the law as to the inapplicability of the defense of condonation
from the sole fact of living with the offending spouse during and
following the continuing offense of cruelty.
46
The bed and board divorce-The Kentucky statute authorizes
a "divorce from bed and board" type of separation for any cause
that would justify an absolute divorce or for any other cause that
'Ahrens v. Ahrens, 230 S.W. 2d 73 (Ky., 1950) (Court also stated that
filing of complaint with personal attack against husband and his family was in-
sufficient recrimination).
' Fenner v. Fenner, 278 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky., 1954) (Affirmed denial of divorce
on evidence of husband's similar cruelty, despite argument that statute does not
mention absence of like fault in giving husband ground of divorce for cruelty.
'2 Shofner v. Shofner, 310 Ky. 868, 222 S.W. 2d 933 (1949).
1 Lewis, Divorce-Does Recrimination Remain in Kentucky?, 40 Ky. L.J. 330
(1952).
"Spears, Domestic Relations-The Modern Trend Toward Rejection of Re-
crimination, 36 Ky. L.J. (1948).
" De Burgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 264 P. 2d 598 (1952). See also the
1953 and 1954 Annual Survey of American Law, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 722 (1954),
30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 680 (1955).
"York v. York, 280 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky., 1955).
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the court in its discretion deems sufficient.47 The effect of such
judicial separation is unlike an absolute divorce in that neither
party may remarry during the life of the other and the property
rights of the surviving spouse are not terminated. One interesting
case arose as to the effect of such a decree upon the property set-
tlement incorporated therein where the parties within a short
time resume living together. 48 The court held that the property
settlement part of the decree was terminated by the resumption
of the marital relations insofar as it purported to bar full dower
and distributive share rights in the surviving spouse. It seems,
however, that a bed and board separation is not automatically
terminated by the resumption of relations by the spouses, since
the statute provides for the setting aside of the decree "by the
court rendering it". 4 9 This point is discussed in a recent note by
Robert C. Moffit.5 0 In one other significant recent case the court
reversed the granting of a bed and board divorce and ordered that
an absolute divorce be granted.51 This result was praised in a
recent note by L. M. Tipton Reed, pointing out objections to a
bed and board divorce where it has proven impossible for the
parties to live together.5 2 When the evidence falls short of suf-
ficient grounds for an absolute divorce it is debatable whether the
solution should be (1) a judicial separation53 or (2) denial of any
decree at all, without prejudice to the right of the parties to seek
an absolute divorce later when the statutory five years' separation
has elapsed.54 The court has wide discretion whether or not to
award a bed and board divorce and the court will be guided by
the circumstances of the individual case.
"Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 403.050.
" Cecil v. Farmers National Bank, 245 S.W. 2d 430 (Ky., 1952).
"403.050. And since the decision, the statute was amended expressly to
provide for annulment of a bed and board divorce by either party showing just
cause. Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 403.042, Laws 1952, c. 84, sec. 1.
'41 Ky. L.J. 322 (1955).
, Coleman v. Coleman, 269 S.W. 2d 730 (Ky., 1954).
" 43 Ky. L.J. 322 (1955). Cf. a concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice
McFaddin of the Arkansas Supreme Court to the decision in McClain v. McClain,
263 S.W. 2d 911 (Ark., 1954), dissent in 264 S.W. 2d 595 (Ark., 1954), lauding
the advantages of limited divorces as encouraging reconciliation, though ad-
mitting that they have almost "passed out of style" in the recent Arkansas cases.
The dissenting opinion also disapproves of the recent trend in Arkansas to limit
the defense of recrimination by the comparative fault qualification.
'Baldwin v. Baldwin, 314 Ky. 399, 235 S.W. 2d 1008 (1951).
" Cadden v. Cadden, 272 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky., 1954).
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ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
During the past few years several articles were published in
the Journal on alimony and support obligations. One by John W.
Murphy discusses comprehensively the remedies available in Ken-
tucky for enforcement of alimony decrees and suggests that the
availability of execution and other remedies to compel payment
of alimony should make use of the contempt process unnecessary
in most cases. 55 A step forward in enforcement of the obligation of
support ot dependents where the person obligated crosses state
lines was taken by the 1954 General Assembly in passage of uni-
form support legislation, discussed in another article by Mr.
Murphy in the Fall, 1954 issue of the Journal."
Some of the most perplexing problems in connection with
support and alimony, as well as divorce, litigation have really
been in the conflict of laws field, yet the domestic relations lawyer
must be aware of these developments. There has been increasing
recognition nationally of the comparatively new concept some-
times termed "divisible divorce", which generally speaking refers
to the right of one state to determine matters relating to alimony
and property rights under limited circumstances although another
awards a divorce.57 One interesting case arose in which the hus-
band, with the wife appearing, procured a divorce in Florida with
no adjudication thereon upon alimony or property rights. 5 The
wife then sued in Kentucky to adjudicate rights with regard to
Kentucky real estate and for alimony. The court said that ali-
mony, though usually incident to a divorce suit, may be recovered
in an action independently of divorce. Further, the court con-
cluded that the Florida divorce decree itself was not conclusive
of the wife's right subsequently to seek alimony there, and there-
fore not conclusive of the right in the Kentucky courts either.
It was a case of the husband seeking a determination of divorce
without alimony in Florida and of the wife seeking adjudication
of only the alimony and property questions in Kentucky. The
Murphy, Enforcement of Alimony Decrees in Kentucky, 41 Ky. L.J. 335
(1953), see also note 35 Ky. L.J. 74 (1946).
Murphy, Uniform Support Legislation, 48 Ky. L.J. 98 (1954).
" See articles: Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 IImv. L. REv. 1287 (1951);
Paulsen, Support Rights and an Out-of-State Divorce, 38 Mrnt. L.R. 709 (1954);
1954 Annual Survey of American Law, Lacy, Family Law, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675,
682 (1955).
"Cooper v. Cooper, 234 S.W. 2d 658 (Ky., 1950).
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court pointed out that it was not required to go as far as the
U.S. Supreme Court did in recognizing "divisible divorce", that
is that divorce based upon domicile of one of the parties may be
a subject of jurisdiction of one state, while the question of alimony
may nevertheless be litigated59 in the home state.
In a later case, discussed above,60 the Court of Appeals in ad-
dition to holding a Nevada divorce invalid for lack of bona fide
domicile to confer jurisdiction, went on to hold that even if the
Nevada divorce were valid the question of alimony and mainte-
nance had not been adjudicated there and was therefore properly
subject to a separate later action in Kentucky. Kentucky thus
seems to recognize the so called "divisible divorce" doctrine under
which the alimony and support question may be left open despite
previous divorce based on domicile if one of the parties is not
served personally and does not appear in the granting state.
61
Similar principles apply in regard to support of children. A
Texas decree based upon jurisdiction from residence of both
parties and providing also for payments for maintenance of the
child of the marriage was given force in Kentucky in Williams v.
West, 62 yet the Kentucky court recognized its own right to modify
the maintenance payments on change of conditions where the
former wife and child were in Kentucky.
The decisions reviewing awards of alimony and support pro-
visions in divorce decrees continue to be very numerous, but in
the main reiterate familiar principles and will not be discussed
here.
CHILDREN
Custody of Children-The recent Kentucky decisions concern-
ing the custody of children will not be discussed since a recent
article by Charles N. Carnes makes a comprehensive survey of the
Kentucky custody decisions in divorce cases from 1940 to 1952
and analyzes the chief factors influencing the courts.63 However,
' Estin v Estin 334 U.S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213 (1948).
' Taylor v. Taylor, 242 S.W. 2d 747 (Ky., 1951)..Goodrich, CONnc'r oF LAWS 413 (Third ed., 1949).
a258 S.W. 2d 468 (Ky., 1953). See also Lockard v. Lockard 237 S.W. 2d
63 (Ky., 1951) and Waters v. Waters, 251 S.W. 2d 580 (Ky., 1952), holding that
a divorce decree does not preclude her from later action to require father to sup-
port children. The action for support inay be had independently of divorce.
0 Carnes, Child Custody in Kentucky Divorce Cases: 1940-1952, 41 Ky. L. J.
324 (1953).
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there are increasingly frequent jurisdictional problems of custody
where the parties cross state lines, as was the case in the divorce
and alimony tangles discussed above. The cardinal principle,
that jurisdiction over custody is based upon domicile of the child
within the state, is continually reaffirmed. 64 Even the court which
has originally acquired jurisdiction and entered an order adjudg-
ing custody loses its continuing jurisdiction to modify when the
child is removed from the state, 5 unless the child's removal is in
violation of the court's decree or for the purpose of escaping its
jurisdiction.66 This principle the Kentucky court applied to hold
void a modification by a Tennessee court of its original custody
decree after the parties had left Tennessee for Kentucky.67 Two
Kentucky decisions declined jurisdiction because of domicile in
other states. The Court of Appeals granted writs of prohibition
to prevent the lower court from adjudging custody in Chamblee
v. Rose,6  where the child was held to retain its father's domicile
in Alabama despite wrongful removal to Kentucky by the riiother,
and in Rodney v. Adams,69 holding that the use of the Kentucky
court by the divorced wife to enforce a previous Nevada support
decree did not give Kentucky power to decide upon the custody of
the child who was domiciled in Florida.
Child welfare-Recent important legislation on child welfare
and the control of juvenile delinquency has already been discussed
in articles by Dr. Gladys Kammerer of the Political Science De-
partment and Professor James W. Hughes of the Sociology De-
partment, University of Kentucky.70 There were amendments to
these laws by the 1954 General Assembly.71
R odney v. Adams, 268 S.W. 2d 940 (Ky., 1954); Chamblee v. Rose, 249
S.W. 2d 775 (Ky., 1952); Marlar v. Howard, 226 S.W. 2d 755 (Ky., 1949).
15 Ibid.
'Beutel v. Beutel, 305 Ky. 683, 205 S.W. 2d 489 (1947), and cases cited
supra note 64.
' Marlar v. Howard, cited supra note 64. Contrast the situation of removal to
another county within the state, in which case the court originally awarding custody
would be the only court with continuing jurisdiction to modify. Weightman v.
Hamilton 261 S.W. 2d 680 (Ky., 1953).
' Cited supra note 64.
' Cited supra note 64.
'0Hughes, The Youth Authority Act, 41 Ky. L.J. 7 (1952); Kammerer, Child
Welfare Legislation, 41 Ky. L.J. 41 (1952).
Kentucky Acts of 1954, c. 193, p. 521, amending Ky. Bzv. STAT. secs.
199.320 and 208.150 et seq.; Kentucky Acts of 1954, c. 185, p. 194, amending
Ky. Ritv. STAT. secs. 208.570-.580.
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Legitimacy-The court has continued to be watchful of the
rights of infant children, avoiding when possible the harsh effects
of illegitimacy. Numerous cases have applied the presumption in
favor of legitimacy. Several cases have stated that evidence of
illegitmacy must go beyond a reasonable doubt, in fact must be
of a higher degree even than that required to convict a person
of a minor criminal offense.7 2 The presumption holds for the
benefit of any child born during marriage, whether conceived
before or after the marriage.73 And evidence of the husband's
sterility is not competent to make illegitimate the child of a mar-
ried mother.7
4
An interesting application of the rule against admitting testi-
mony by married spouses of non-access during coverture, when
the result of allowing the testimony would be bastardization of
the child, arose in Dudley's Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.75
The testimony by the mother and her earlier husband of non-
parentage was held properly admitted (and given probative
force), because under the peculiar facts of the case the child
would be legitimate anyhow since the mother had subsequently
married another man who had acknowledged the child as his own.
Apparently such subsequent marriage plus recognition of parent-
hood by the father would legitimatize the child, even though the
subsequent marriage itself logically falls in the void category,
bigamous because of the impediment of the prior marriage. This
is consistent with a previous interpretation by the court of the
recognition statute in a related situation when it held legitimation
accomplished by recognition even though one of the parties was
married to another at the time of conception. The whole problem
will be examined in a student note currently being written for
the Journal.
Occasion arose requiring construction of the language of the
so called "legitimacy saving" statute providing that the "issue of
all other [i.e. other than incestuous or miscegenous] illegal or void
marriages is legitimate". 0 A child of a purported Ohio common
72 Ousley v. Ousley, 261 S.W. 2d 817 (Ky., 1953); Williams v. Williams, 311
Ky. 45,223 S.W. 2d 360 (1949).
"ross v. Gross, 260 S.W. 2d 655 (Ky., 1953).
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 236 S.W. 2d 477 (Ky., 1951).
" 240 S.W. 2d 76 (Ky., 1949).
"Ky. RExv. STAT. sec. 390.100(2).
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law marriage claimed as "issue". Since the mother was at the time
already married to another man, however, the Ohio relationship
had no consequence whatever as a marriage either in Ohio or Ken-
tucky. In holding that the statute saved the child's legitimacy, the
court pointed to a previous decision that the statute made legiti-
mate even a child of a bigamous ceremonial marriage and re-
fused any distinction between a void ceremonial marriage and a
void common law marriage in this regard.77 The court's inter-
pretation can be reinforced by the statutory listing of "prohibited
and void" marriages, which specifically includes the case "...
where there is a husband or wife living, from whom there has
not been a divorce". 7 The same should be true by analogy in the
case of children of outlawed "common law" marriages taking place
in Kentucky, since common law marriages, though completely
void for most purposes, are likewise listed in the same statute
among the "prohibited and void marriages".
The "recognition" statute according legitimacy to the child of
an unwed mother if the father subsequently marries her and at
any time acknowledges the child as his own was applied in Dud-
ley's Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,79 Furthermore, for in-
heritance purposes, it appears from one interesting case that the
effect of legitimacy can sometimes be achieved quite independently
of the statute and of subsequent marriage to the unwed mother.
In Caudill v. Caudill,80 the illegitimate child was held entitled to
inherit from the estate of the father by virtue of an oral agree-
ment between the unwed mother and the alleged father whereby
the latter agreed to such inheritance in consideration of the
mother's forbearing from bringing bastardy proceedings against
the father.
Even in a most summary sketch of recent developments in the
law of domestic relations, special mention must be made of a
Resolution of the 1954 General Assembly because of the po-
tentialities it offers for future improvement in the law. House
Resolution 41 directs the Judicial Council to make a thorough
' Copenhaver v. Hemphill, 235 S.W. 2d 778 (Ky., 1951).
Ky. BRv. STAT., sec. 402.020.
Cited supra note 75, applying Ky. REv. STAT., sec. 391.090(3).
257 S.W. 2d 557 (Ky., 1952).
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investigation of existing Kentucky divorce law and of "Family
Courts" as used in other states and report its findings and pro-
posed legislation to the 1956 General Assembly."- This study is to
be coordinated with a comprehensive study of the entire court
structure by the Legislative Research Commission 2 and any real
developments may well have to await the recommendations under
the more general study.
' H.R. 41 approved March 28, 1954, Kentucky Acts, 1954, c. 281, page 702.
"S.R. 52, approved March 28, 1954, Kentucky Acts, 1954, c. 268, page 689.
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